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## **EXPLORING INTERPERSONAL COMPONENTS OF LANGUAGE IN A WORK OF FICTION**

This paper investigates interpersonal meanings in a work of fiction created by the use of various modal expressions and the ideology that lies behind two different modal systems constructed in it. The analysis of modality is conducted on the corpus of the essay *A Room of One's Own* by Virginia Woolf within the framework of discourse analysis (DA) and pragmatics. Within DA the research is focused on the function of modal expressions in the overall discourse organization, while the pragmatic aspect is more focused on the dominant role of context in determining the meaning of frequently very polysemic modal expressions. The analysis comprises over 90 examples of modal use which all contain the pronoun *one* occupying the syntactic function of a subject. The paper investigates how *one* as a subject, which defocuses the agent, is linked to various modal expressions from the communicative-functional approach, when its semantics implies animacy and human behaviour, linking it therefore to the speaker and the expression of subjectivity. Various modal expressions, which can represent different modal systems, are being looked into from the aspect of different ideologies construed in the essay – possibility, probability, inference, obligation, permission etc.

Keywords: modality; modal expressions; discourse analysis; pragmatics; pronoun *one*

### **1. Introduction**

Within systemic-functional approach modality is discourse oriented, which means linguistic as well as extra-linguistic contextual factors are taken into consideration, as opposed to traditional monolithic grammar approaches.

*Modalization* and *modulation*, the two main types of modality within this approach, refer to expressing non-categorical propositions with the help of various degrees of probability, possibility, necessity and prediction in case of *modalization*, which is restricted to what is called *epistemic* modality, *dynamic* modality and *evidentiality*. *Modulation* includes permission, obligation and volition and implies the speaker's control of events, unlike *modalization*. According to Halliday and Matthiessen (2004: 150) it actually refers to *root*, *deontic* and *boulomaic* modality. While *modalization* involves the writer's evaluation of the state of mind, *modulation* refers to the participant's attitude towards a process, i.e. his/her enthusiasm and willingness to take responsibility for a certain action.

Both types of modality represent a very useful tool in analysing linguistic features of a type of written discourse that considers views on an ideological plan, with an aim to persuade its readers, as is the case with Virginia Woolf's essay *A Room of One's Own*. *Modulation* or *deontic* modality is a modal system used to impose obligation, give permission and express prediction under speaker's control, with the intention of a change that will lead to approaching some standard or ideal. *Modalization* or *epistemic* modality refers to the writer's assumptions or evaluations of possibility and his/her commitment (or lack of commitment) to the truth of a proposition. More precisely, it expresses the speaker's/writer's reservations about the truth of a proposition, or its validity (Coates 1983: 18–20). These two domains of modality, which form different semantic ideologies, ranging from possibility and prediction (*epistemic* modality) to permission, obligation and volition (*deontic*, *root* or *non-epistemic* modality), can put into operation interpersonal components of language (speaker's evaluation of the probability and the attitude towards a proposition > *epistemic* modality; speaker's ability, volition and authority > *non-epistemic* modality) (Halliday 1970: 338).

## 2. Theoretical background

Different authors define modality in a similar way as „a speaker's attitude towards, or opinion about, the truth of a proposition expressed by a sentence“ (Simpson 1993: 47), as a means of expressing a degree of commitment to the truth of a proposition (Fowler 1996: 166–167), or a semantic information connected to the „speaker's opinion“ or „attitude“ towards a proposition (Palmer 1986:16). The same authors, however, suggest different types of modality, often causing difficulties in differentiating between them. Palmer (1986:18)

suggests a distinction between *epistemic*<sup>1</sup> and *non-epistemic* modality<sup>2</sup>, whereas Simpson (1993: 47–49) opts for four types of modality, including *deontic*, *boulomaic*, *epistemic* and *perception* modality. *Boulomaic* and *perception* modality in Simpson's terms are actually subcategories or supplements to either *deontic* or *epistemic* modality: *boulomaic* modality is a subcategory of *deontic* modality, expressing the speaker's wish or desire (*I wish...., I hope...., I regret....*), and *perception* modality is a supplement to *epistemic* modality, expressing the degree of commitment to the validity of a proposition based on some reference to human perception (Simpson 1993: 50)<sup>3</sup>, usually visual.

Traditional approaches to exploring modality link this category of language meaning exclusively to the use of modal auxiliary verbs which have always been considered the most important means of expressing either *epistemic* or *non-epistemic* modal meaning. However, modal auxiliaries are not the only means of expressing certain types of modality. There are many other language resources which represent a means of construing modal systems in English language: modal adjuncts, such as modal adverbs used to reinforce the truth of an utterance, which Quirk et al. (1983: 583) refer to as emphasisers<sup>4</sup> (*obviously, really, certainly* etc.). Other resources include constructions with the verb *to be* (*be anxious to, be supposed to, be keen to*), lexical verbs (*believe, think, know*), adjectives and nouns (*clear, sure, true, truth, belief, proof*), as well as structures where modal interpretation is covert and implied by the semantic structure of the whole sentence (*One just doesn't do things like that*). All the above mentioned language resources represent a means of construing the two modal systems in English language, which reflect the interpersonal meaning. Accordingly, Halliday (1994: 357) defined modality (*modalization*) within the systemic-functional approach as a main constituent of the interpersonal metafunction of language, used to establish, maintain and specify the relationship between the members of a certain social community. Halliday differentiates between the two types of modality within the systemic-functional approach, one of which is *modalization*, and the other is *modulation* (Eggins 1994: 178–179).

In this paper we attempt to look into Woolf's construction of an interpersonal relationship with her readers, in which the reader adopts a particular textual role and is assigned a complementary role the author wishes him to adopt in his turn (Halliday and Matthiessen 2004: 106). This means that inter-

<sup>1</sup> *Epistemic* modality is also referred to as *persuasiveness* or *inferentiality* (Vuković 2014: 38).

<sup>2</sup> *Non-epistemic* modality is further divided into *deontic* and *dynamic* modality, which are used to express either obligations or abilities and skills.

<sup>3</sup> *It is clear that you are wrong./ You are clearly wrong.*

<sup>4</sup> Emphasisers are a subtype of subjuncts which express the semantic role of modality.

personal meanings created by the writer play a role in building her image and open up a discursive space within which the reader can either accept, or deny writer's propositions.

### 3. Methodology

This paper deals with exploring the aspects of modality within the interpersonal metafunction of language in the corpus where the most frequent modal auxiliaries *can*, *cannot*, *could*, *would* and *must* are predominantly found in sentences with the pronoun *one* in the syntactic function of a subject. The material was manually processed to find items expressing modality and the data collected for this research show that modal verbs used in sentences with *one* as a subject sometimes reflect external imposition of choices, and sometimes participants' subjective beliefs. Interpretations are varied and related to either participant's distancing from the utterance or to portraying his/her claims as general truth.

The analysis of sentences expressing modality and containing pronoun *one* in subject position provide excellent insight into the type of processes usually modalized by one of the previously mentioned modal operators, considering that the majority of modal verbs can be used to express two or more modal meanings, often interconnected. This implies an exceptional semantic complexity of modal verbs and modal expressions in general, manifested through their nuanced meanings, and no absolute semantic differences between modal verbs, which can be congruent. Therefore, the immediate linguistic context is of immense importance when it comes to distinguishing the true meaning behind each modal verb and mutual relations between them (Palmer 1986).

Our approach to the study of various types of modal use in this particular corpus is based on a synergy of models suggested by Coates (1983) and Palmer (1986), which is complementary to the classification of modality within the systemic-functional framework, comprising subjective and objective modality. Subjective modality is usually realized by either mental processes in the first-person present tense (*I think* / *I reckon* / *I suspect*), or relational processes (*I'm convinced* / *I'm sure*), which the speaker is implicitly involved in and is morally responsible for his/her judgments. Objective modality is usually expressed by using one of the modal adjectives (*It's likely* / *It's certain*), or by nominalization of probability (*There is no possibility* / *There is no need*), by which the speaker is detached from his/her commitment to the modal judgment (Martin 1997: 68–69). Halliday (1994: 362) believes such explicit forms of subjective and objective modality are inherently metaphoric

in nature and emphasize the narrative point of view. Psychological point of view, first introduced by Fowler (1986: 127–147), is connected to the two main types of modal systems, which enable the speaker/narrator to achieve important communicative functions, including commenting on and interpreting reality (*epistemic* category) and intervention which leads to a change of events (*deontic* category). When looking into the psychological point of view, we are concerned with the question of the observation of narrative events: whether the observer is the narrator, the author or the character (ibid.: 134).

In this analysis it is hypothesised:

a) Woolf combined *epistemic* and *non-epistemic* modal systems in a narrative discourse where the narration is in the first person and the subjective point of view prevails;

b) *epistemic* modality is more represented in the corpus, since this literary genre can be read as an academic article, sharing many similarities with the academic type of discourse (its informative application, critical review of a sensitive subject of women and fiction, a speculative way of dealing with the topic, etc.). On the other hand, *epistemic* modality is very frequent in academic prose (Butler 1994), as well as the *immunization* strategy and the *hedging*, which represent an important linguistic means of reducing personal responsibility within this modal system;

c) since *epistemic* modality is typically subjective in nature, and subjectivity is the main feature of modalized utterances based on thought, mental processes will be more frequently *epistemically* modalized than other processes (material processes, for example);

d) our efforts to properly tag modalized processes within the corpus will depend not only on our linguistic starting points, but will to a large degree also be focused on the contextual framework. The meaning of each modal domain cannot only be the question of a linguistic category; it is connected to the way we experience the world around us and act in our physical and social surrounding;

In light of this, we investigated more than 90 instances of modalized processes in the essay, in which the syntactic position of a subject is occupied by the pronoun *one*. The aim was to show which processes are modalized within each modal system and why, how pronoun *one* as a subject can be interpreted according to the typology suggested by Wales (1980b), what the true meaning behind each modal expression in the analysed discourse discovers about the ideology of the essay, and what possible readings can the reader choose from.

## 4. Results

### 4.1. *Types of modalized processes and their reading within the epistemic modal system*

The results of the analysis show that most frequent modal verbs used to modalize processes listed in Table 1. are the auxiliaries *could*, followed by the verbs *would*, *might* and *may*. There is one instance of the *epistemic* use of the verb *seem* (*one seemed alone*) and the construction *one was to do*. All the aforecited modal auxiliaries are accompanied by the pronoun *one* in subject position. Mental processes are the most represented *epistemically* modalized processes, which is in accordance with the aforementioned hypothesis (c).

Table 1. Types of epistemically modalized processes

Epistemic modal processes	Frequencies
Mental processes	21
Material processes	16
Verbal processes	9
Relational processes	8
Behavioral processes	1

### 4.2. *Types of modalized processes and their reading within the non-epistemic modal system*

This modal category generally expresses permission, prohibition, obligation and necessity in terms of freedom of action (*deontic* modality) and volition of the subject to perform an action using their own energy (*dynamic* modality) (Coates 1983: 245). However, the meaning of a particular modal domain is not only the question of a linguistic category, it is also connected to the way we experience reality and act in a physical and social surrounding (hypotheses *d*). Therefore were the linguistic aspects of the analysis strongly supported by the contextual framework in our efforts to properly tag instances of modalized processes in which the pronoun *one* has the syntactic function of the subject. There are instances of modalized processes where it is not entirely clear whether they express *epistemic* or *non-epistemic* modality, since different modal domains can be congruent or overlap to a large extent. This necessarily results in extreme flexibility of the pragmatic meaning of certain modal expressions, which makes accurate and precise interpretation very difficult (ibid.: 16).

In our analysis we determined the processes modalised within the *non-epistemic* modal domain according to some general contextual and syntactic features suggested by Coates (1983), Auwera and Plungian (1998) and Nuyts (2001). The results presented in Table 2. show the highest frequency of the types of processes modalised within the *non-epistemic* modal category: most frequent *non-epistemic* modal processes are mental and material processes, followed by verbal processes, only one behavioral process and no recorded relational processes.

Table 2. Types of *non-epistemically* modalized processes

Non-epistemic modal processes	Frequencies
Mental processes	18
Material processes	16
Verbal processes	4
Behavioral processes	1
Relational processes	Ø

## 5. Discussion

It is surprising that material processes are at the very top of Table 1, because this type of processes is usually not *epistemically* modalized. The reason is that material processes express very concrete physical actions, and *epistemic* modality constructs the world with a nimbus of unreality, expressing a degree or a level of knowledge, ignorance or belief that belong either to the narrator or the author. Material processes in this analysis are expressed by a) verbs of abstract doing, where pronoun *one* is a passive actor (*do, accept, state, find, continue, fail, collect* etc.) and b) verbs of movement away from the subject (*go, leave*). These processes mostly express actions which the subject (*one*) can/could do within some hypothetical time.

Another peculiarity recorded in Table 1. refers to only one instance of *epistemically* modalized behavioral process, expressed by the verb *sit*. This type of processes represents human behaviour at the border between material and mental processes. They are more closely related to „doing“, typical of material processes, than to „sensing“, which is more typical of mental processes. However, „doing“ expressed via a behavioral process can turn into a type of mental or even verbal process.<sup>5</sup> The subject in this case has a passive

<sup>5</sup> Behavioral processes in fiction prose introduce direct discourse and add behavioristic features to verbal processes.



role, representing a conscious human being whose behaviour is a hypothetical assumption considering external conditions. This fully complies with Halliday's definition of behavioral processes as a type of process which represents external manifestations of internal state of mind, or the action of the processes of consciousness (*lost in thought*) and physical conditions (sitting, body posture) (Halliday 1994: 107).

(1) There one might have sat the clock round lost in thought.

Mental processes are the most frequently *epistemically* modalized processes, since *epistemic* modality is typically subjective in nature, and subjectivity is the main feature of modalized processes based on thought. Within *epistemically* modalized processes certain verbs expressing mental processes have been used as *hedges* to decrease responsibility of the subject: *conclude*, *suppose* and *generalize*. These verbs represent *epistemic* lexical verbs of assessment, which express mental processes whose semantic domain includes a speculative and deductive function. Opposite them there are *epistemic* lexical verbs of evidentiality, which are based on sensory evidence of the subject or the information given by other people: *see*, *feel* and *hear*. Together with the subject *one*, which is also considered a *hedging* device<sup>6</sup>, they verify the utterance and make the reader believe that all the claims, beliefs and conclusions are imposed by facts and are not a reflection of personal views. Clyne (1987) claims that *hedging* performative verbs such as *conclude*, *suggest* and *show* is a means of *immunization* which strongly reduces the fear of criticism and the risk of confrontation. Since the essay *A Room of One's Own* can be considered an academic type of discourse (informative use, critical review of a sensitive topic – women writing fiction, a speculative way of dealing with the topic and an expository type of discourse), the strategy of *immunization* and *hedging* is quite obvious. The writer's voice can be read through the narrator expressing her claims about the legitimacy of the conclusions based on the past and the present events, as well as on her own experience, knowledge and emotions. The pronoun *one* as the subject in these processes refers to an apparently missing author, who with the narrator's help guides the reader through the discourse of the essay, manipulating in this way the structure of his/her knowledge.

<sup>6</sup> Using certain pronouns and avoiding other is a very important *hedging* device in discourse (Markkanen and Schröder 1997).



(2) And one must conclude<sup>7</sup> that it would be a thousand pities if it were hindered or wasted, for it was worn by centuries of the most drastic discipline, and there is nothing to take its place.

Verbal processes, modalized by some *epistemic* modal verbs, are expressed by verbs *say*, *swear* and *question*. Processes like speaking, convincing, explaining, questioning etc. are symbolic processes construed in human mind and realized by the above mentioned verbs. These processes modalized within *epistemic* modal domain express an estimation of possible or probable communication which implies a subject's awareness of certain facts based on personal knowledge, tradition or opinion. The subject responsible for processes that can/could be or could have been verbalized is an impersonal „someone“ which enables the narrator/author to avoid taking responsibility directly. Constructions such as *one might be talking* or *one could say nothing of the sort* refer to a subject „Sayer“ who is not capable of making an utterance or expressing a view, although the subject is in direct interaction with words that, however, describe events and situations out of his/her reach:

(3) No, one could say nothing of the sort.

Relational processes, expressed by verbs *be*, *set to* and *name*, are usually considered to express a type of processes in which the change takes place in an inert manner, lacking ability, strength or energy on the part of the subject. As opposed to material processes, this type is interpreted as static and expressing relations arising from external and internal experience. Within the *epistemic* modality they are mostly expressed by the verb *be* and are used in establishing a relationship between the two entities. It is claimed for something or somebody to be/to have been something else: *one might be merely lazy minded*, *one must have been something of a firebrand*. In all found examples where relational processes are expressed by the verb *be*, pronoun *one* is the „Carrier“ of an attribute, usually qualitative in nature and expressed by one of the adjectives and/or adjective phrases such as *angry*, *woman-manly*, *man-womanly* and *lazy minded*. These represent some kind of a quality which the subject should, could or must have possessed. Relational processes are in most cases expressed as a condition (*one would have not been angry*), or a change (*one could set that humming noise to words*), while the subject mostly „carries“ characteristics anchored in both external and internal experience (consciousness, reasoning, imagination):

<sup>7</sup> Hyland (1996: 481) calls lexical verbs *suggest*, *believe*, *conclude*, *show* and *appear* *epistemic* judgement verbs and claims they function as *hedges*, which means linguistic devices used by the narrator/author to 1) express uncertainty towards propositions made, 2) increase their politeness and social acceptability in order to avoid conflicts between the narrator/author and their audience.

(4) Could one set that humming noise to words?

Apart from modal auxiliaries, processes listed in Table 1. are also modalized by certain modal adjuncts. Within traditional grammar approaches these word forms are described as having a threefold effect on the evaluation of the validity of the statement: emphasizing (*certainly*), approximating (*probably*) or restricting effect (*only*) (Quirk et al.: 1985). One modal adjunct, typically used in speculative modal contexts is *almost*, which belongs to a group of so called *degree adjuncts* and their subcategory of *intensifiers*, giving a modified verb an approximative meaning:

(5) One could almost do without dinner after such a luncheon.

Processes like the one shown in example (5) are often modalized by some of the other *epistemic* modal adjuncts including *possible*, *probably* and *perhaps*. These signify activities and actions which the subject (pronoun *one*) can or could do, to ensure a change of state of being or identity in some hypothetical time. Processes modalized in this way and expressed by certain verbs of doing (*do*, *accept*, *state*, *find*, *continue*, *fail*, *prove*, *collect* etc.) express activities not performed at the time being, although they could be; however, it remains unclear when. Consequently this implies a much lower degree of responsibility of the subject:

(6) Perhaps with the help of the poets one could.

Mental processes are mostly modalised with the *non-epistemic* modal auxiliary *can*, which expresses either *deontic* possibility or *dynamic* ability, especially with verbs expressing perception (*see*, *hear*, *feel*, *sense*) and cognition (*think*, *understand*, *remember*). Negative modal auxiliary *cannot* is exclusively linked to expressing *non-epistemic* modality, whereas *could not* is in a large percentage an *epistemic* modal verb. Modal auxiliary *can*, according to Coates (1983: 19), has no *epistemic* meaning, which we basically agree with (we found no *epistemic* meaning of this auxiliary in the corpus), although it should be noted firm boundaries between *epistemic* and *non-epistemic* readings of certain modals (*can* and *may*) are sometimes very unclear and are subject to overlapping. They can express different meanings that cross the boundaries between the two modal categories and are properly interpreted only within the context:

(7) At any rate, when a subject is highly controversial – and any question about sex is that – one cannot hope to tell the truth.

(8) One can only show how one came to hold whatever opinion one does hold.

In both examples the pronoun *one* is accompanied by *non-epistemic* modal auxiliaries *cannot* and *can*, which aim to express an objective *non-epistemic* modality directed at an event influenced by circumstances and inde-

pendent of the subject. The subject is contextually bound referring to people who include the narrator, her public and all the readership involved in an emotional mental process expressed by the verb *hope*. The expression *at any rate* can be interpreted within the interpersonal metafunction of language as a modal adjunct representing a type of comment on the previous discourse.

In example (8) the process (*show*) is emphasized by the modal adjunct *only* and modalized by the modal auxiliary *can* which together express the intensity of narrator's stream of thought. Her thoughts are the result of an objective state of affairs, conditioned by external influences, not subjective beliefs.

The modal auxiliary *may* can regularly express both *epistemic* and *non-epistemic* modality, notably its core meaning refers to *epistemic* possibility. However, when it expresses *non-epistemic* modality, it usually refers to very formal contexts. In our analysis two instances of the modal auxiliary *may* were found, referring to *deontic* modality, modalising two different processes and accompanying the subject *one*, whose referents are *I* + other people:

(9) It is useless to go to the great men writers for help, however much one may go to them for pleasure.

(10)...and whatever the value of unmitigated masculinity upon the state, one may question the effect of it upon the art of poetry.

The modal auxiliary *must* belongs to the so called *high value modals* (Halliday 1994)<sup>8</sup> and is used to express strong obligation. In this analysis two typical grammatical structures including *must* were found: 1) *must* + infinitive and 2) *must* + have + past participle. *Must* can also have both *epistemic* and *non-epistemic* meaning, depending on whether it expresses necessity (its nuanced meanings can refer to inference and certainty of facts), or obligation, compulsion or demand. Its *non-epistemic* (*deontic*) meaning is quite undetermined, so Palmer (1990) created two subcategories of *non-epistemic* modality in order to try to define the domain more precisely. Palmer (ibid.) differentiates between *deontic* and *dynamic* modality, in which the speaker is (not) the source of obligation. Palmer (ibid.: 91), however, admits there is no clear cut between the two meanings, although „the distinction *deontic* vs. *dynamic* facilitates description of the relationship between *must* and *have (got) to*.“ Coates (1983) claims *must* expresses an *epistemic* meaning whenever speaker's beliefs are referred to in structures *I think* and have/be + present/past participle. *Epistemic must* usually expresses speaker's assessment of the validity of what has been said, based on logical conclusion about known facts. *Deontic must* is also strongly related to the speaker, leaving an impression of imposing the

<sup>8</sup> *High value modals* express very strong opinions in the discourse, reflecting the dominance of a particular social status and the speaker's personality.

obligation on the speaking subject him-/herself. It is therefore strongly related to the speaker's/narrator's point of view, and in assertive sentences it is used to express necessity and strong advice or command to him-/herself or to other people. In this analysis the structure *must* + infinitive prevails, expressing *deontic* modality in most instances, and almost all modalized verbs express material processes (*one must strain off, one must do, one must submit, one must read*, etc.). Grammatical structure containing the modal auxiliary *must* and the infinitive is closely connected to expressing *deontic* meanings, which can be explained by the fact that *deontic* modal verbs are generally performative (Palmer 1986: 98) and the speaker clearly takes responsibility for imposing obligation or necessity.

From the point of *non-epistemic* modal system the discourse of the essay becomes more obligatory, much stronger and more convincing, referring to the subject's intensions and wishes, as well as imaginary situations. Actions within this modal domain can be classified as static portrayals of internal states and mental acts (*think, realize, remember*). The portrayals of mental states can be interpreted as frames used to determine the internal potential for external action (Halliday and Matthiessen 2004: 208). Hodge and Kress (1993: 92) claim that first person utterances express first-hand reliability and an indisputable authority. If the subject is in the third person, distance and detachment are expressed, which can give the utterance a strong sense of impersonality. The modal value does not depend on the assessment coming from the first person experience, which means the first person subject *I* actually restricts the scope of utterance, while the third person subject *one* is a neutral transmitter whose utterance is presented as authoritative. It follows: the more ambiguous the subject, the greater the authority of the proposition.

## 6. Conclusion

Although both modal domains are combined in the essay *A Room of One's Own*, *epistemic* modality prevails, and the discourse of the essay is pervaded by uncertainty. In the foreground comes the narrator's attempt to interpret her perceptions and give sense to the reality surrounding her. The dominance of the *epistemic* modality in the discourse implies greater insecurity of the subject in relation to events and participants, but also a certain amount of cynicism towards them (Simpson 1993: 58). Pronoun *one* in the position of the syntactic subject can mostly be tagged as generic-egocentric, which means that in most instances its referents include the first person pronoun *I* and other people, so it can hardly be called impersonal *one*. Impersonality would suggest the absence of a person, which is contrary to who this pronoun

refers to – a human being. Although this human is seemingly out of focus, he/she is present, and this presence consequently expresses intersubjectivity. The narrator's/speaker's experience extends to other people who should be able to imagine themselves being in the same or similar situations showing empathy. These strategies of expressing solidarity are indicators of interpersonal (intersubjective) functions, because by involving the speaker and the listener (the writer and the reader) into a narrative experience, the expressive power of discourse is reinforced (Scheibman 2007).

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## ISTRAŽIVANJE INTERPERSONALNIH KOMPONENTI JEZIKA U PROZNOM DJELU

U radu istražujemo interpersonalna značenja u proznom djelu nastala uporabom različitih modalnih izraza i stvaranjem ideologija koje se kriju iza dvaju različitih modalnih sustava konstruiranih u njemu. Analiza modalnosti provodi se na korpusu eseja *A Room of One's Own* Virginije Woolf u okviru analize diskursa (AD-a) i pragmatike. U okviru AD-a istraživanje je usmjereno na funkciju različitih modalnih izraza u cjelokupnoj organizaciji diskursa, dok je pragmatički aspekt više usmjeren na prevladavajuću ulogu konteksta u određivanju značenja često vrlo polisemnih modalnih izraza. Analiza obuhvaća preko 90 primjera uporabe različitih tipova modalnosti u kojima se na mjestu sintaktičkog subjekta nalazi zamjenica *one*. Istražujemo na koji način je zamjenica *one*, koja inače defokusira vršitelja, povezana s različitim modalnim izrazima s komunikacijsko-funkcionalnog stajališta. Poznato je da semantika ove zamjenice podrazumijeva živost i ljudsko ponašanje, povezujući ju tako s govornikom i izrazima subjektivnosti. Različiti modalni izrazi koji predstavljaju različite modalne sustave sagledavaju se s aspekta raznih

ideologija konstruiranih u eseju, a uključuju mogućnost, vjerojatnost, zaključivanje, obvezu, dopuštenje itd.

Ključne riječi: *modalnost, modalni izrazi, analiza diskursa, pragmatika, zamjenica one, komunikacijsko-funkcionalni pristup*